Suicide Responsibility of Hospital and Psychiatrist by Perr, Irwin N.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1960
Suicide Responsibility of Hospital and Psychiatrist
Irwin N. Perr
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Law and Psychology Commons, and the Medical Jurisprudence Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Irwin N. Perr, Suicide Responsibility of Hospital and Psychiatrist, 9 Clev.-Marshall L. Rev. 427 (1960)
Suicide Responsibility of Hospital
and Psychiatrist
Irwin N. Perr*
S UICIDE IS NOW THE TENTH GREATEST CAUSE of death in the United
States.1 It has become an increasingly larger factor statisti-
cally, because, as other causes of death come under medical con-
trol, the prevalence of suicide becomes more noticeable. In the
last ten years, at the very minimum, two-hundred thousand
(200,000) Americans have killed themselves, and in all likeli-
hood, more Americans have died in the last twenty years at
their own hands than were killed in World War II and the Korean
War combined. It is also possible that suicides outnumber those
killed in automobile accidents as is clearly the case in England.2
Thus the problem of suicide is a prominent public health
problem in this country. Physicians and hospitals have an ob-
vious concern, as do the law courts, where actions for wrongful
death and negligence may involve suicide as a result of a tortious
act. An example of the extremes reached in law was the case of
Cauverien v. De Metz,3 in which a diamond broker gave some
diamonds to a dealer who not only refused to return them, but
denied that he ever had received them. This act allegedly
* B.S., M.D., Assistant Superintendent and Clinical Director, Fairhill Psy-
chiatric Hospital (formerly The Cleveland Regional Treatment Center);
Diplomate, American Board of Neurology and Psychiatry, Secretary-Treas-
urer of The Ohio Psychiatric Association; Senior at Cleveland-Marshall Law
School.
I Reports vary as to the ranking of suicide as a cause of death. Daniels re-
ports that it is the ninth leading cause of death and the second greatest
cause of death in medical students. Daniels, D. H., Review of Suicide Cases
with Reference to Appraisal of Their Risk and Prevention. 49 J. Maine Med.
Assn. 258 (July, 1958).
2 Parnell, R. W., and Skottowe, I., Towards Preventing Suicide, 1957 Lancet
(1) 206 (Jan. 26, 1957).
3 Cauverien v. DeMetz, 188 N. Y. S. 2d 627 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. County, 1959);
cf. Daniels v. N. Y., N. H., and H. R. Co., 183 Mass. 393, 67 N. E. 424 (1903);
Elliott v. Stone Baking Co., 176 S. E. 112 (Ga., 1934); Trumbaturi v. Katz &
Besthoff, 180 La. 915, 158 S. 16 (1934), Eckerds v. McGhee, 86 S. W. 2d 570
(Tenn. 1935); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N. Y. 2d 16, 176 N. Y. S. 2d 996 (1958);
Restatement, Torts, Sec. 455; Prosser, Torts, 273 (2d ed. 1955).
Professor Howard L. Oleck comments on the Cauverien case, "This is a
landmark decision. It points to an ultimate rule holding tortfeasors liable
for many 'purely mental' injuries hitherto not deemed actionable. Adoption
of so advanced a view by a major court such as N. Y. promises rapid spread
of this view. Fear of uncertainties of proof, or of a flood of cases, should
not protect malicious or willful wrongdoers from liability for their wrong-
doing. If the wrong is morally evident, let the jury decide the sufficiency
of the evidence." 5 Negl. & Comp. Service (7) 54 (Jan. 1, 1960).
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harmed the decedents' reputation to such an extent that it caused
an "uncontrollable impulse" to commit suicide. Another bizarre
case was Deitz v. Bumstead4 , where damages were allowed
where a man killed himself twelve years after a back injury, the
court holding that there was a sufficient connection between
the back injury and a diagnosis of manic-depressive psychosis
ten years later followed in two more years by suicide.
These cases illustrate some of the fascinating and wondrous
aspects of suicide. However, this paper will restrict comment to
the principles and application of present law as to the responsi-
bility of the psychiatric hospital and the psychiatrist and a dis-
cussion of some of the applicable psychiatric factors. Thus
topics which will not be discussed are trauma and suicide,
suicide in general hospitals, the handling of delirious patients,
or public versus private hospitals.
In any event, the psychiatrist, the state, and hospital man-
agement all have great interest in their liability in cases of
suicide whether the claim is wrongful death due to negligence
or malpractice.
The basic law as to hospitals is that a hospital owes to its
patients a specific duty of care. If it neglects this duty and,
through the neglect, the patient is enabled to commit suicide,
the hospital may be liable for its negligence under the wrongful
death statute. To determine if there is negligence, it is necessary
to establish the degree of care required. This is usually ex-
pressed in this manner-a hospital must exercise such reasonable
care and attention for the safety of its patients as their mental
and physical condition, if it was or should be known, may require.
A brief review of various cases reveals much contradictory
law or contradictory application of law. In Stansfield v. Gard-
ner5, a patient jumped from the stairs of a hospital and later he
himself sued the hospital for the injuries that he suffered. The
court stated that a hospital is not an insurer against a self-
inflicted injury, but that the hospital is only required to use
ordinary care and diligence. If the hospital may reasonably con-
clude that a patient may harm himself unless preclusive measures
are taken, the reasonable care in the circumstances to prevent
such harm is indicated. One is not required to guard against
4 Deitz v. Wm. H. Bumstead, Inc., 168 N. Y. S. 2d 669, 5 App. Div. 2d 739
(1957). See also Wood v. Samaritan Institution, 156 P. 2d 470, Revd., 26 Cal.
2d 847, 161 P. 2d 556 (1945).
5 Stansfield v. Gardner, 56 Ga. App. 634, 193 S. E. 375 (1937).
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an action which a reasonable person under the circumstances
would not anticipate as likely to happen. Thus, where a person
came to a hospital voluntarily6 , was mild and docile, and suddenly
ran away from the hospital, the hospital was not liable for the
effects of exposure suffered by the patient.
In Mills v. Society of New York, 7 a patient going for a walk
with nine other patients and two aides suddenly ran in front of
a bus and was killed. The patient had been in the hospital for
three months and had been considered as improved. Held-no
liability.
On the other hand, in Noel v. Menninger Foundation," a
seventy-one year old man while going for a walk with an at-
tendant threw himself in front of a bus and was killed. On his
admission to the hospital there was no noticeable suicide tend-
ency, though it was thought that he might become a suicidal
risk. His diagnosis was "hypochondriacal psychoneurotic" of
long standing. He became more paranoid, and electric shock
therapy and lobotomy were being considered. While he later
threatened suicide, he had left the hospital on occasion with his
wife. Held-the Menninger Foundation was liable-a result
opposite to that in the Mills case.
In various cases where patients left the hospital and were
found dead 9, drowned in a lake"° , or hit by a railroad train",
these later acts were held to be subsequent and independent
acts with the allegedly negligent act of the hospital not the
proximate cause of the death, or that the acts were not foresee-
able and thus that there was no negligence. In the Hohman
case, above, where the decedent had twice previously attempted
suicide, the court held that the hospital had only a duty to
observe him and give him medical treatment. This is an inter-
esting case as it implies the distinction which has become so
important-are hospitals places to treat sick people or are they
maximum security prisons? The changing role of the hospital
will be enlarged upon below.
6 Dahlberg v. Jones, 232 Wis. 6, 285 N. W. 841 (1939).
7 Mills vs. Society of New York Hospital, 274 N. Y. S. 233, 242 App. Div. 245,
270 N. Y. 594, 1 N. E. 2d 346 (1936).
8 Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 180 Kan. 23, 299 P. 2d 38 (1956).
9 Hohmann v. Riverlawn Sanatorium, 103 N. J. L. 458, 135 A. 817 (1927).
10 Hawthorne v. Blythewood, Inc., 118 Conn. 677, 174 A. 81 (1934).
11 Hebel v. Hinsdale Sanitarium and Hospital, 2 Ill. App. 2d 527, 119 N. E.
2d 506 (1954).
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The courts have commented that suicide is "an accompani-
ment" of manic-depressive psychosis, 12 or that one of the char-
acteristics of schizophrenia is a tendency to commit suicide.
1 3
These erroneous concepts will be dissected below.
There have been cases in which hospitals and/or physicians
have been held liable in addition to those above mentioned.
14
Other cases have denied liability.15
In a New York case, 1( a chronic schizophrenic had been
hospitalized for seven years. There had been one suicide attempt
in his history. In the last two years of his hospitalization he left
the hospital frequently on passes. While away from the hospital
on a days' pass he committed suicide. His schizophrenia was
considered to be "incurable," but he had shown no suicidal
tendencies prior to his suicide. The state prevailed because at
that time it was immune to suit, but the court made the state-
ment that "under such a situation and in view of his past history,
it was negligence to permit the patient to leave the hospital
unattended." This fantastic statement on the part of the court
can reflect only its ignorance. The feeling that all chronically ill
patients should be constantly locked up and guarded is a relic
of medieval thinking and represents an attitude long since de-
molished in mental health circles. Hospitals abroad and in this
country have increasingly "opened up," and given patients
more freedom, with great improvement in discharge rates. The
irony of the situation is indicated by the fact that the New York
State Department of Mental Hygiene has been leading the country
in progress in the treatment of the mentally ill and in developing
the open ward hospital, while its courts render opinions almost
perverse in view of the progress in the twentieth century.
A case which shows much greater insight into the nature
of the problems involved is a Tennessee case of 1942, James v.
12 Supra, note 10.
13 Supra, note 5.
14 Gries v. Long Island Home, 83 N. Y. S. 2d 728, 274 App. Div. 938 (1948);
Fowler v. Norways Sanitarium, 42 N. E. 2d 418 (Ind. 1942); Lange v. U. S.,
179 F. Supp. 777 (1960), Re Apicella's Estate, 140 N. Y. S. 2d 634, 207 Misc.
743 (1955); Rural Education Ass'n. v. Anderson, 37 Tenn. App. 209, 261
S. W. 2d 151 (1953); Hirsch v. State of N. Y., 183 N. Y. S. 2d 175 (Ct. Claims,
1959). And see generally, suicide (not hospital) cases: Ackerman v. Dairy-
men's League Coop. Assn., 10 App. Div. 2d 112 (N. Y. 1960); Prudential Ins.
Co. v. Redwine, 332 S. W. 2d 643 (Ky. App. 1960).
15 Tisinger vs. Woolley, 78 Ga. App. 18, 50 S. E. 2d 122 (1948), Lewis v.
State, 152 N. Y. S. 2d 161, 1 Misc. 2d 1078 (1956)-a senile psychosis case.
16 Kubas vs. State, 96 N. Y. S. 2d 408, 198 Misc. 130 (1949), aff'd. 104 N. Y. S.
2d 856, 278 App. Div. 887 (1951).
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Turner.17 Here a patient who had voluntarily admitted himself
to a private sanitarium, while walking with an attendant sud-
denly ran to a water reservoir, climbed up, jumped in, and
drowned. He was a chronic alcoholic who had threatened suicide
previously.
The physicians were held not guilty of negligence that would
render them liable for the patients' death. The court stated that
"It might well be said that the use of ropes or handcuffs or
other restraining forces would have retarded his natural progress
in regaining his health, both mental and physical." The accuracy
of the court's words, written in 1942, is attested to by the fact
that physical restrains in hospitals have since been almost totally
abolished.
In this specific case, the patient had earlier had some flexi-
bility of movement, such as going to the barber shop in town. The
court further commented, "Can it be said that it was within
reasonable contemplation that the patient would suddenly dash
away, climb the tank ladder and end his life, any more than it
can be said that he could have run off and into a public street or
thoroughfare and purposely allowed an automobile to run over
him; or any more than it can be said that it could have been
reasonably anticipated that he would see a knife or razor hidden
in the grass and there suddenly take it and end his life? These
things are possibilities, not probabilities."
Thus cases on sudden impulse suicides have reached op-
posite conclusions on similar factual situations. The basic law
involves questions of foreseeability and controllability. For ex-
ample, in one case' the court stated, "The attendant could not
have prevented the assault. The presence of almost twenty-five
other patients did not prevent the assault. At a matter of law, the
state is not compelled to provide individual supervision for
every mental patient. The state is not an insurer of the safety
of such patients. Claimant has not sustained the burden of
proving that the state has failed to use reasonable care against
a foreseeable occurrence."
A few words on "malpractice." A physician is liable for
bad or unskillful practice resulting in injury to the patient. He
must use a degree of skill comparable to that possessed by others
in his profession or medical specialty. In determining the learn-
17 James v. Turner, 201 S. W. 2d 691 (Tenn., 1942).
18 Robinson v. State of N. Y., 17 Misc. 2d 775 (N. Y., 1959).
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ing and skill necessary in the treatment of a particular case,
regard must be had to the state of medical knowledge at the
time. A physician is not liable for injurious consequences if he
exercises the required degree of skill and care. It should be
noted that where there are several accepted methods of treat-
ment, the physician may adopt any one of them even though
the one not chosen is not the one most generally used.
There are few cases involving malpractice and suicide, since
ordinarily the failure claimed is one of lack of watchfulness over
the patient in the hospital, and this is a duty of the hospital, not
the doctor; secondly, a doctor is not the insurer of a good result
nor must his judgment be correct. It must only be reasonable
and in accord with accepted practice. And of course, there is
the factor that most people cannot accept the irrationality of
attributing the behavior of one person to others who have no
control over the acts of another.19 A physician need not be
omniscient nor insure a good result. As statistics will show, he
can do neither.
Thus far in this paper, we have encountered the words,
"reasonable," "anticipated," "foreseeable," "preventable," and
"controllable." Since these words cover the essence of any legal
case involving the standards of care in a potential suicide, let
us turn to the information available to decide what they mean.
The starting place in any effort to relate law with suicide
is a study of suicide itself.
Hirsch,20 a Professor of Environmental Medicine at the
Albert Einstein Medical Center in New York, reports that while
the reported number of suicides per year is sixteen thousand
(16,000) to twenty thousand (20,000), a substantial number of
suicide deaths are not so recorded on death certificates because
of religious, social, or moral stigma, and he estimates the actual
number of suicides a year at fifty thousand (50,000) to sixty
thousand (60,000), or a rate of about 35/100,000 in contrast to
reported rates of 10-15/100,000. Using Hirsch's estimates, the
number of suicides is higher than the number of those killed in
auto accidents. Statistics vary widely from place to place. Civi-
lized countries such as Denmark and Japan lead the world, al-
though suicides in the large California cities exceed even these.
19 A physician is not liable for an injury caused by the act of the patient.
Dunman v. Raney, 118 Ark. 337, 176 S. W. 339 (1915); Richards v. Willard,
176 Pa. 181, 35 A. 114 (1896).
20 Hirsch, J., Suicide. 43 Ment. Hyg. 516 (Oct., 1959).
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Why the rate in Denmark is three times that of Norway raises
puzzling questions.
It must be recognized that many physicians or families do
not report overt suicides or do not recognize them. In many
areas there is no coroner's office to evaluate the possibility of
a barbiturate death, or other hidden causes of death. Even when
cases come to autopsy it is often difficult to decide between
accidental overdosage or overdosage while under alcohol or pur-
poseful overdosage. Due to social factors, doubts are usually
resolved in favor of such more socially acceptable solutions as
accidental death. Another group that can be mentioned only
in passing is the variety of unrecordable forms of suicide-
the diabetic who refuses to take insulin and eats ravenously, the
alcoholic found dead of overexposure, the driver who passes a
car on a curve going uphill.
An acquaintance of mine had marked suicidal tendencies
which blossomed forth only when he was drinking. While there
was no indication of this during his frequent periods of sobriety,
when drinking he would fall down stairs, out second story
windows, off fire escapes, or if driving, he would crash into trees.
Only "fate" and the positive factors in his psyche prevented
his becoming another accidental death statistic.
For those who think that suicide is recognizable, predictable,
or preventable, the unfortunate fact is that the highest rate of
suicide is found in physicians. While psychoanalysis provides
one of our best means of psychiatric treatment, no less than
seven of Freud's early disciples died by suicide.2 1
It is well known that a person can commit suicide despite
all precautions. Clothes, eating instruments, any type of glass
or metal, access to heights or moving objects, all can provide
the means of self-destruction. Now with open hospitals such
as those in New York, where for example, in one hospital of two
thousand (2,000) patients 96 percent have free ingress and
egress, suicide is available to almost any patient. Nonetheless,
the protective nature of the hospital, the removal from stress,
the emotional support, and the treatment programs, all act to
lessen urges to suicide. Even in old and large state hospitals with
relative absence of supervision, suicide assumes a role scarcely
different from that in the general population. In California 22
21 Gibbs, W. F., Therapy for Suicidal Patients. 85 Virginia Med. Month. (3)
139 (Mar., 1958).
22 Annual Report, California Department of Mental Hygiene (1955).
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state hospitals of all types in 1955, there were ten suicides in
a hospital population of thirty-seven thousand (37,000) mentally
ill and eight thousand (8,000) mentally deficient. In Ohio23 in
1958, there were fourteen suicides in a population of thirty-six
thousand (36,000) of whom twenty-seven thousand (27,000) were
mentally ill and nine thousand (9,000) epileptic and mentally de-
ficient. Twelve occurred while the patients were away from the
hospital-for example, at home on Trial Visit. Only two occurred
in hospitals. In New York24 in 1959, there were twenty-nine
suicides in a hospital population of ninety thousand (90,000).
Thus in these three large systems with one hundred and seventy-
one thousand patients (171,000) the suicide rate in the hospitals
was 24/100,000-a rate not greatly different from that of the
general population.
Apparently as hospitals have loosened up and treated
patients more humanely, the suicide rate in mental hospitals has
dropped. For example, in 1958 in Ohio the rate in hospitals was
1.6 per ten thousand (10,000) admissions and even including those
on trial visit, the rate was eleven per ten thousand (10,000) ad-
missions. The rate in New York was 11.6 per ten thousand (10,-
000) admissions. In contrast, in a Washington State Hospital over
a period from 1891 to 1949, the rate was thirty-eight per ten
thousand (10,000) admissions. 25 In 1959 the suicide rate in New
York was 32/100,000 resident patients per year, compared with
an average rate of 42.3/100,000 in the decade of 1919-1929.26
Unfortunately, study of the attempted suicide group has not
furnished material particularly applicable to suicide itself, and
the difficulties of analyzing the successful suicide are obvious.
One can only speculate in retrospect. The attempted suicide
represents a vastly different type of problem and a different type
of individual. For instance, while women attempt suicide at least
23 Personal Communication: Division of Business Administration, Ohio De-
partment of Mental Hygiene and Correction.
24 Personal Communication: Director, Statistical Services, State of New
York Department of Mental Hygiene.
25 Levy, S. and Southcombe, R. H., Suicide in a State Hospital for the Men-
tally Ill. 117 J. Nerv. Ment. Dis. (June, 1953). In the Eastern State Hospital,
Washington, there were 15,999 admissions from 1891 to 1949 with 58 suicides.
Another interesting statistic is that in 1945, of 14,782 reported suicides in the
United States only 284 (1.9%) occurred in mental hospitals as compared
with 2,783 (18.8%) in general hospitals.
26 Rosen, A., Detection of Suicidal Patients: Example of Some Limitations
in the Prediction of Infrequent Events, 18 J. Consult. Psychol. 397 (Dec.,
1954).
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three or four times more frequently than men, men kill them-
selves three times more often than woman.27 A study at Yale
illustrated that suicide attempts or gestures are often utilized
by patients to alter their environments, and the surprise fact
was that such individuals were most successful in manipulating
family or friends.
While I was at Bellevue Hospital in New York, we would
admit as many as a dozen attempted suicides a night. Typically
these were Puerto Ricans who had made impulsive hysterical
suicidal gestures. After an hour or two the patients calmed
down and they were usually sent home the next day. We saw
so many of these immature hysterical people that we called this,
"the Puerto Rican Syndrome."
In one study of 1817 attempted suicides 28 , the incidence of
psychosis was 6.7%; in another of 114729 only 5.9%. Other
smaller studies have indicated higher rates of psychosis.30 Thus,
even for immediate treatment most patients are not commitable,
nor can they thus be held in a hospital against their will. Only
a very small proportion of those who attempt suicide finally die
by suicide-one study gives a number of 6%. There is marked
disagreement as to the apparent seriousness of the suicide at-
tempt being of diagnostic significance. Two studies based on
psychological testing of three groups of patients-(1) those with
suicidal thoughts, (2) those who had attempted suicide and (3)
psychiatric patients in general-showed that the patients who
attempted suicide as a group were similar to patients in general,
27 Tuckman, J. and Lavell, M., Study of Suicide in Philadelphia, 73 Pub.
Health Rep. (6) 547 (June, 1958).
Suicides in Philadelphia were analyzed in the period of 1951-1955 by
the Medical Examiner's office. Philadelphia had three male suicides to one
female suicide. Other interesting facts are that the rate in whites is two to
three times that of negroes (with apparent reverse relationship to homi-
cide). In Cleveland the rate in whites is 14.8/100,000 compared with
5.7/100,000 in non-whites. Reported rates in various cities are Philadelphia
(7.2/100,000), Cleveland (12.8/100,000 in 1953-54), Detroit (9.8/100,000 in
1955), and Baltimore (10.0/100,000 in 1955).
Hirsch's figures for males and females were 16 and 4.6 per 100,000 re-
spectively.
28 Piker, P., Eighteen Hundred and Seventeen Cases of Suicidal Attempt.
A preliminary statistical survey, 95 Am. J. Psychiat. 97 (July, 1938).
29 Moore, M., Cases of Attempted Suicide in a General Hospital-a study in
social and psychologic medicine, 217 New Eng. J. Med. 219 (Aug. 1937).
30 See Vitanza, A., Church, E., and Offenkrantz, W., Suicide: A Review of
the Literature 1945-1956, 170 Internat. Rec. Med. (12) 678 (1957). This re-
port reviews 107 articles on the subject.
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while the suicidal thought group was more seriously disturbed.3 1
Though the possibility of suicide exists with depression, the
number of suicides is small in comparison with the vast number
of depressives. At the Fairhill Psychiatric Hospital of Cleveland,
about 15% of the patients in the Out-Patient Department show
clinical depression. In our hospital population, there has been
one patient suicide. This patient was diagnosed as a chronic
undifferentiated schizophrenic; he had demonstrated no suicidal
tendencies, had gone home on passes and was being considered
for discharge. Following four days at home, he went looking for
a job and that afternoon jumped off a bridge in downtown Cleve-
land. Frustration and rejection in his job seeking may have been
a factor in this impulsive suicide. Thirty percent of our ad-
missions have had diagnoses involving some type of depression,
though most were mild or moderate in degree. Many were
neurotic depressions, which seem to have a very low suicide
rate.
Of the fourteen suicides in Ohio hospitals the breakdown
by diagnosis was:
Neurotic Depressive Reaction 0
Psychotic Depressive Reaction --- _ 0
Involutional Psychotic Reaction -- 2
Manic-Depressive Reaction 1
Schizophrenic Reactions
Schizoaffective type 1
Other Schizophrenic Reactions 6
Since schizophrenics usually make up about one-half the
hospital population, the incidence would show no great signifi-
cance. Other diagnoses were:
Psychoneurotic Reaction, Other - 1
Alcoholism -- 1-----------------1
Passive Aggressive Personality 1
Paranoid State ------------------------------------ 1
This goes along with general experience that suicide does
not follow diagnostic categories in any predictable manner.
Of all suicides in Philadelphia in a five year period, one-
eighth showed some evidence of mental disorder with one-
sixteenth having been under psychiatric care.
31 (a) Rosen, A., Hales, W. M., and Simon, W., Classification of "Suicidal
Patients," 18 J. Consult. Psychol. 359 (1954).
(b) Rosen, A., Detection of Suicidal Patients; an Example of Some
Limitations in The Prediction of Infrequent Events, 18 J. Consult. Psychol.
397 (Dec., 1954).
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Of those who attempted suicide, about 94% do not later
die by suicide. Of those who die by suicide, 90% have no pre-
vious history of suicide attempt. Thus attempted suicide is of
little value as a means of prediction. Parnell and Skottowe
32
state, "From the preventive point of view the most significant
fact in the present findings is the small number of patients show-
ing disorders of thinking, the change so often regarded by the
general public as a sine qua non for admission to a general
hospital."
The stress on involutional and manic-depressive depressions
in the past has probably been because, of all conditions, here
there is the best predictability however poor, and also because
these cases must be hospitalized usually because of the overall
collection of symptoms which respond well to treatment. Even
here it is known that these patients may die by suicide after
their illness has improved. It is an upsetting situation when the
patient recovers from his disabling symptoms, goes home, and
then kills himself. Wall 33, in giving criteria for severe depres-
sion meriting hospitalization, points out, "families of suicidal
patients should know that no hospital can guarantee the absolute
safety of a patient even though precautionary measures and
vigilance of the highest type are maintained."
Many psychiatrists have stressed the difficulty in predicting
the possibility of suicide in a particular patient. The old equation
of suicide and manic-depressive depression has long since been
demolished.
Carr, Professor of Legal Medicine at the University of Cali-
fornia, points out 34 that "there have been many clinical attempts
to establish criteria that would be of assistance in predicting
suicide in certain types of mental disorders, but so far no reliable
guide has been found." The main problem in prediction lies in
the uncertainty one feels as to whether or not a patient will
commit a suicidal act and also whether that act will take the
form of a suicidal demonstration, a suicidal attempt, or suicide.
... It seems rather doubtful whether we shall be able to predict
precisely what suicidal action an individual is going to take
clinically because the disease is not fully developed until the
moment of decision."
32 Parnell, R. W., and Skottowe, I., Towards Preventing Suicide, 1957 Lan-
cet 206 (1) (Jan., 1957).
33 Wall, J. H., The Psychiatric Problem of Suicide, 101 Am. J. Psychiat. 404
(Nov., 1944).
34 Carr, J. L., Suicide, 170 Internat. Rec. Md. (11) 613 (Nov., 1957).
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Zilboorg, in several articles on suicide, pointed out the un-
predictable nature of suicide. Since suicide is such a rare event
statistically, prediction becomes impossible. For instance, Rosen,
a psychologist,3 5 postulated in a much criticized article, a series
of events worth consideration. In one series of twelve thousand
(12,000) patient admissions, there were forty suicides. A prog-
nostic test of 75% (and nothing that good exists) would pick
up 30 of the 40, but it might also give 2,990 false positives. While
his reasoning is fallacious, it points out that prediction of events
of low incidence is fraught with difficulty. He also points out
that there is the same difficulty in a prediction based on "clinical
judgment" and states "a suicide detection device is not feasible
until much more is learned about the differential characteristics
of patients who commit suicide."
Thus, in any given case the psychiatrist deals with possi-
bilities of a remote and unpredictable but ever present nature.
He never deals with probabilities-only possibilities of un-
measurable degrees. Unlike the situation elsewhere where a dis-
aster occurs because of an act by the physician-for example,
leaving scissors in the abdomen during surgery, here the disaster
arises from the act of the individual patient. Not only can the
disaster not be accurately anticipated, but the patient himself
changes from day to day, week to week, and month to month.
The patient's problems-whether they be alcoholism, a sex
problem, economic difficulties, chronic physical illness, or any
other condition in the gamut of psychiatry-may show marked
improvement. How does one predict from that point?
Here are some typical situations:
(1) A middle aged female alcoholic with severe environ-
mental problems has been taking excessive barbiturates. In a
financial panic, she takes thirty nembutal after heavy drinking.
She is brought to the general hospital unconscious. The next
day, conscious but somewhat confused and depressed, she is
brought to a psychiatric hospital. In a few days the depression
has lifted considerably and she is back to her normal character
pattern, which dictates troubles in the future similar to those
in the past and not especially subject to alteration. She is not
mentally ill by any definition. What will be the course of events
in this case?
35 Supra, note 31 (b).
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(2) There are fifteen thousand schizophrenics in the hospitals
of a state (in addition to at least thirty-thousand not hospitalized).
Seven of those hospitalized will die by suicide in a given year.
Who are they? Who will suddenly jump from a bridge or from
a height, or hang himself? What can be done to recognize and
stop such act on a permanent basis? Are you going to lock
up and tie the arms and legs of 15,000 people as an absolute
preventive measure? And if you did this would you then in-
crease the suicide rate by such inhumane handling of people?
(3) A severely depressed patient is brought to the hospital.
The patient is restricted to the ward for the first few days.
Despite frequent observation, numerous opportunities for self-
destructive actions are present due to the nature of the hospital
construction, the staffing, and the fact that you can control a
person against his will only to a limited degree. The patient
wears clothes. These can be twisted into a rope and used as an
instrument for hanging. Are clothes to be removed? If you
watch the patient closely, how long? After one day the patient
seems more comfortable, is partaking of ward activities, does
not seem so depressed. He may be placed on drugs, electric
shock, or individual psycho-therapy. He seems better and wants
to go home. The family is faced with a large bill and is under
considerable pressure from the patient. If he is kept in the
hospital, what good will further hospitalization do? Will it merely
postpone things? What will happen?
These are only sample situations with innumerable potential
variations. They raise questions to which no one, at this stage
of development of human knowledge, has the answers.
Thus, a mass of confusing data has been presented to illus-
trate our relative helplessness in the face of suicide-a social
problem that has not been particularly altered by time. The
causes and treatment of this act of complex etiologies are not
yet defined, nor, by its nature, does any solution seem very likely.
Therefore, we must accept the fact that suicide is a problem
characterized by marked limitations in predictability and con-
trol-not only in hospitals but throughout our society, of which
the hospital aspect represents only a minute element.
These are factors which must be considered by the court
and the jury in deciding the liability of a hospital where a
suicide occurs. In the past, isolated legal decisions indicated
that the standard of care was close observation, restriction, and
restraint. This standard of care has fallen into complete dis-
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repute in modern hospitals as being anti-therapeutic and so ag-
gravating of feelings of worthlessness as to possibly provoke
suicidal acts. In contrast, reversal of this policy in hospitals, in
addition to aiding in the treatment of all types of mental illness
and shortening the periods of hospitalization, has apparently
resulted in a somewhat lessened suicide rate as well as a de-
creased rate of destruction and violence. For example, in the
older prison-like hospitals, destruction of hospital equipment
and property was great. In the modern psychiatric hospital with
a decent atmosphere and good treatment, the patient does not
feel so strongly the urge to strike out at the environment or
himself. In former times, glass was an item covered by screens
or wire mesh or was made unbreakable. In many hospitals to-
day, there are numerous chandeliers, paintings in glass frames,
and other types of glass fixtures. At the Fairhill Psychiatric
Hospital there has been practically no destruction of property
by patients, who in general appreciate the advantages of a
therapeutic environment.
It would be the height of irony if the courts, in their effort
to promote the public welfare, would by legal decision force the
continuance of harmful and outdated practices. For example,
in Wasmuth's study on anesthesiology 0 , he has pointed out how,
by adverse legal decisions, California anesthesiologists have been
intimidated into abandoning as too dangerous procedures which
are often accepted elsewhere in the country as procedures of
choice.
In conclusion, it is obvious that psychiatrists and hospitals
are much concerned with the problem of suicide. Part of this
concern and anxiety is based on a feeling of helplessness in that
there is no control, nor predictability as to what will happen,
when, where, how, or by whom.
The law demands reasonable care in foreseeable situations.
This is a sound and logical principle. A civilized society can ask
only that the law be applied in an intelligent and rational manner.
However, we cannot cover up our ignorance and our inability
to control our social problems by proclaiming the misinformation
and prejudice of the past. After all, in both law and medicine,
recognition of ignorance is the first step to knowledge, and only
from knowledge does there come method, instead of the madness
so prevalent in our society.
36 Wasmuth, C. E., Court Dictation of Choice of Anesthesia, 6 Clev.-Mar.
L. R. 461 (Sept., 1957).
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